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Want More Value From Prescription Drugs? We Need to Let Prices Rise and Fall
Abstract
The high price of some cancer drugs has recently come under attack by the medical profession. We
examine the reasons behind the pricing strategies of cancer drugs. On the one hand, prices should reflect
value and research demonstrates that the health benefits from novel cancer drugs have been enormous
in terms of additional years of life patients can now enjoy. This provides some justification for the high
price tag of these drugs. On the other hand, drug pricing is also a product of a hidebound reimbursement
system that does a poor job in letting prices adjust to new information about value. Regulators set
thresholds for cost-effectiveness, which establishes not only a price ceiling but also a price floor.
Manufacturers often price drugs high at launch in efforts to recoup their initial investment, but a more
efficient system would allow prices to both rise and fall over time. Removing distortions in the
reimbursement system is crucial to ensuring continued success in saving lives.
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A group of distinguished international cancer physicians recently joined together
to decry what they called the “astronomical, unsustainable, and perhaps even
immoral” prices of cancer drugs.1 In the name of saving patients, they appealed
to drug manufacturers to lower their prices.
The group’s remarks made for important political theater in the policy debate
over healthcare costs. But they skirted the question of why the drugs’ prices are
high to begin with. In large part, drug manufacturers are locked into an approval
and reimbursement system that distorts the underlying value of their products and
makes high initial prices the best option for recouping their investment. In fact,
some regulators set thresholds for cost-effectiveness, which sets not only a price
ceiling but also a price floor. Introducing pricing flexibility into these systems,
1 Kantarjian et al. (2013).
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which would enable drug prices to both rise and fall in response to new information
about a drug’s value, is crucial to ensuring that patients get the drugs they need.
The cancer physicians focused on their specialty, a relatively rare form of
cancer called chronic myelogenous leukemia, or CML. Before the development
of imatinib – the novel cancer drug, popularly known as Gleevec, used to treat
CML – 80 percent of patients diagnosed with the disease died within 10 years.
Imatinib lowered that rate to 20 percent – a reduction so dramatic that patients
“now live close to normal life spans.”2
The physicians argued that a drug’s price – Gleevec costs $76,000 per year –
“must reflect worth.” So what is the “worth” of those extensions in lifespan that
CML patients enjoy? Our research shows that imatinib, manufactured by Novartis,
created more than $88 billion in social value in terms of patients’ survival gains
and drug-company profits over the lifetime of CML patients.3 What is Novartis’
cut? The answer is 10 percent, a fraction typical for a range of other cancer drugs:
our research finds patients enjoy between 81 percent and 95 percent of the social
value that drugs create, with manufacturers earning a minority of social welfare
in terms of profits.4
The oncologists readily acknowledged that drug manufacturers deserve
some positive return on their investments in order to encourage them to spend
billions more on new drug research. Recouping 10 percent of the total value of
cancer-drug innovations doesn’t seem unreasonable, given that these drugs will
eventually lose patent protection and that, over their lifetimes, they are far more
cost-effective than pricing at their launch would suggest.5
But securing such a return on investment, short of high initial prices, is virtually impossible in our current drug approval and reimbursement system. The key
problem is that information on survival benefits and the range of diseases a drug
can treat often trickles out slowly over time and after a drug is on the market, but
prices – which are often dictated by regulators both here and abroad – do not
adjust to reflect changes to the drug’s value.
Traditionally, an experimental drug’s approval was predicated on demonstrating that it improved patients’ survival rates vis-à-vis those under standard
care. But waiting for differences in overall survival rates to show up can delay
approval up to 10 years or more, blocking patients’ access to potentially helpful
therapies and driving up the costs of developing drugs.

2
3
4
5

Kantarjian et al. (2013).
Yin et al. (2012).
Lakdawalla et al. (2010).
Lu et al. (2012).
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Recognizing these issues, regulators around the world, including the Food
and Drug Administration, have started to consider “surrogate endpoints” when
evaluating new drugs.6 One such biological endpoint is tumor size, which is
predictive of clinical outcomes like survival. In 2006, the FDA approved Sutent
for treatment of both gastrointestinal and kidney cancers based on the drug’s
ability to slow tumor growth.7 More conservative European regulators also allow
surrogate endpoints, at least in conjunction with other outcome measures, when
approving a drug.8
But approval and reimbursement are very different decisions. Progress on the
approval front has collided with a hidebound reimbursement system. Even if the
FDA approves a drug based on surrogate endpoints, insurers may be reluctant to
reimburse for a treatment that hasn’t yet demonstrated a survival benefit. This
problem is exacerbated in cases where the drug is very expensive.
Consider the case of the immunotherapy drug Provenge for prostate cancer,
which costs $93,000 for a course of treatment. The FDA denied approval in 2007
despite a positive recommendation from its own advisory panel, only to approve
the drug 3 years later. It took another year before Medicare would pay for it. The
official reason given for Medicare’s holdup was to evaluate the drug’s off-label
uses, but doctors, including the American Society of Clinical Oncology, read the
lack of immediate coverage as a consequence of the drug’s high price tag.9
So what can be done?
Determining a drug’s value at its launch is difficult. Over time, for example,
we sometimes learn that a drug can help treat conditions not considered at the
time of its debut, which should theoretically increase its value. In fact, the FDA
approved imatinib to treat the most common form of pediatric cancer, acute lymphoblastic leukemia, in January.10 This expanded use of imatinib may make that
drug’s value higher than our $88 billion estimate for CML alone.
But the current reimbursement system is simply not designed to absorb this
new information and, as a result, is horribly inefficient in fairly matching a drug’s
value to its price. Think of a stock market insensitive to new information: On what
basis would you determine the value of a company?
If regulators raised prices with evidence of added value, manufacturers
would have less incentive to set high prices at a drug’s launch. And regulators
could argue for lower reimbursement until new clinical evidence arose to support
6 Garrido and Mangiapane (2009).
7 Food and Drug Administration (2006).
8 Garrido and Mangiapane (2009).
9 Pharmalot (2010).
10 Wall Street Journal (2013).
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higher prices. Drug prices would thus reflect their underlying value, and products
would get to market sooner.
But right now, insurers and regulators such as Medicare are trapped on the
wrong path, where no one has an incentive to adjust prices. A private insurer
won’t offer to pay more than its competitors if a drug becomes more valuable, so
prices don’t rise. And Medicare follows private insurers by reimbursing based on
average sales prices. In economic parlance, we are stuck at a bad equilibrium.
We might look to Medicare, as the largest payer, to break out of the mold since,
according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), cancer drugs comprise
over 40 percent of the most expensive medications under Medicare Part B. With
Medicare taking the lead, private insurers might be forced to follow.
In many respects, we are winning the war on cancer, with patients living
longer thanks largely to innovative treatments. Making cancer drug prices sensitive to new information, whether beneficial or disappointing, would help ensure
continued success in saving lives.
Previously published online July 26, 2013
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